| When we learned of the Gulf oil explosion this past | | | | attempts to explain his comments and actions, the |
| April, the loss of life coupled with the hourly projections | | | | court of public opinion already rendered a verdict. |
| about environmental fallout was disturbing enough. | | | | Of the many milestone events which ultimately led to |
| However, to learn that BP had no real crisis plan or | | | | Mr. Hayward's dismissal, one particular event |
| immediate solution to deal with this type of incident | | | | negatively impacted his career, BP's stock and sent |
| immediately instilled a sense of anger among many | | | | the BP brand cascading downward like no other. That |
| stakeholders. | | | | event was the Congressional hearings where all |
| One of the biggest "eye brow raising moments" early | | | | company executives involved decided to point the |
| on was to watch BP executives on NBC's Today | | | | finger at one another. The resulting public message |
| Show respond to a question/statement by an anchor | | | | was a failure to take responsibility. In fact, the President |
| during an interview. The question to the executive was | | | | of the United States stood-up and said he was "not |
| "You had no crisis plan to deal with this, did you?" Well, | | | | impressed" by that spectacle. Yes, now the leaders of |
| the executive did not answer the question and quickly | | | | three major corporations were being admonished |
| directed his response in another direction, never | | | | publically by the World's most influential leader. |
| answering the "yes or no" question. Clearly, BP was at | | | | The fact is, during times of crisis, leaders become |
| a loss on how to handle this catastrophic, yet | | | | fatigued and often misstep. In BP's case, Hayward |
| predictable event. | | | | didn't have what Dr.'s George Everly and Doug |
| It is true, based on the continual resulting blunders that | | | | Strouse refer to in their book (The Secrets of Resilient |
| BP did not have a handle on how to effectively | | | | Leadership, 2010) as Behavioral Body Armor. As |
| communicate with all of its stakeholders during the | | | | highlighted in the book and many other publications, |
| worst oil spill in U.S. history. Adversity is the truest test | | | | resilient leadership has a few main tenants which |
| of leadership and BP failed the test due to poor | | | | should never be violated. They include: |
| planning and execution. The very basic tenants of | | | | 1. Act with integrity |
| crisis leadership did not present themselves in this | | | | 2. Communicate effectively |
| case. While many suffered, top executive Tony | | | | 3. Display optimistic, decisive leadership |
| Hayward gave the public impression that he cared | | | | 4. Take responsibility for actions |
| more about how his life was disrupted than the millions | | | | 5. Build a resilient culture |
| who depend on BP from a financial or livelihood | | | | 6. Develop behavioral body armor |
| standpoint. | | | | I wholeheartedly recommend that leaders at every |
| Comments Mr. Hayward made about how he "wanted | | | | level of management in both the public and private |
| his life back" or how he minimized the leak because | | | | sector, personally or professionally, embrace these |
| the leak was occurring in "a big ocean" were bad | | | | principles. Had BP crisis planned before the incident, |
| enough, but the symbolic participation in a yacht race | | | | been forthright with information and followed the six |
| during a time of crisis sent the wrong message to | | | | basic tenants above, we all might have a different |
| many whose quality of life still remained in the balance. | | | | perspective. |
| While Mr. Hayward apologized and made later | | | | |